THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 July 1979

AT MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted], RMS/CLLO

SUBJECT : Classification of DCID 1/5

Thank you for your comments on DCID L/5. Having looked it over again, however, I believe we were correct in classifying it, despite unclassified sources which reveal some portions. It does reveal CIA missions, functions, and organizational matters as described [redacted] ST
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[redacted] ST

Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
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1 - WWG File

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Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200150016-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Br

After checking through the NFAC Classification Guide and glancing at the NSCIDs and DCIDs, I think it would be a difficult task to defend the present SECRET classification of 1/5.

A quick look at the attached list of DCIDs, their subject matter, and their classifications (or lack of), makes the outlook even bleaker.

Of the 8 NSCIDs, 50% are unclassified, 25% are classified in part, & 25% are classified Secret. Of the 43 DCIDs, 72% are classified & 28% are not. Of that 72% that are classified, 42% are Secret and 58% are Confidential.

Lynn

Date 13 July 79

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Classification of DCID 1/5

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
RMS/CLLO		DATE 6 July 1979

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Richard Lehman, NIO for Warning				Dear Dick: The attached exhibits were copied from material readily at hand. Don't you agree they put into jeopardy the classification of the new DCID 1/5? I have not seen this new DCID before, else I would have pointed this out earlier.
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Exhibit 6

Notes from the Director No.

11 October 1978

NIO FOR WARNING

One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the broader sense—warning of any development serious enough to concern the President and the National Security Council.

It is apparent that we need a stronger national structure for warning than that which now exists. I have therefore asked Dick Lehman to step aside from his position as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him a special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

In this capacity as NIO/Warning, he will be my senior staff officer for all warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency "Warning Working Group," and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level warning committee chaired by the DDCI. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. He will also be my "ombudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a serious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my name.

In the establishment of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will be asking many of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just another bureaucratic exercise; it is a serious effort to meet a critical requirement. The NIO/Warning will have my strong personal backing.

CHANNELS FOR DISSENT

The principal method for the expression of dissent within the Agency involves the various avenues available within each Directorate for challenging or testing analysis, policy and procedure. This is a process which must take place in a routine yet vigorous fashion if our products and activities are to be maintained at a level of high quality. The squelching of divergent views on significant issues can lead to intellectual stagnation and second-rate performance. It is important, therefore, that

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Exhibit 3

UNCLAS

Secretary of Defense

Donald H. Rumsfeld

ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT

FY 1977

of Defense's major Program III (Intelligence and Security), does not include "intelligence-related" activities which belong in the combat force and other major programs which they are designed to support. However, the ASD(I) has provided both management guidance and review in these areas. Chart VA-2 on the following page depicts the resource allocation structure as it has been organized.

5. THE CDIP

The CDIP includes a number of major program areas which include the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The management of signals intelligence resources and activities in the CCP is carried out by the Director of NSA who acts as the program manager. In this role, he determines the resources required by NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) which collect signals intelligence in the field.

The General Defense Intelligence Program, which is made up of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Service intelligence organizations, and some of the intelligence activities of the Unified and Specified Commands, has been monitored by the ASD(I). The GDIP is the primary program for the management of requirements and coordination of collection activities, the analysis of collected intelligence data and its conversion into meaningful intelligence products and services for Department of Defense consumers. It is concerned with current intelligence, intelligence estimates, long-range studies, and the analysis of foreign scientific and technical progress. Included here are the Defense Attache System and special elements from each of the three Services that engage in collection of human intelligence.

The Service intelligence organizations, in addition to providing intelligence for coordinated DIA intelligence product, are responsible for ensuring the collection and reporting of intelligence that concerns their individual military missions.

While ASD(I) has advised on overall intelligence and intelligence-related management and resource allocation, it does not produce intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible to the JCS and the Secretary for integrating and producing coordinated Defense intelligence. This distinction between the roles of these two organizations is important to the understanding of how the business of defense intelligence is conducted.

6. "INTELLIGENCE-RELATED" ACTIVITIES

There are activities in the strategic forces, general purpose forces, training and research and development programs which we now designate as "intelligence-related" activities since they are designed to provide intelligence support to military forces. As mentioned earlier, we plan to manage these activities in an intelligence framework as well as in their basic force structure program. The Deputy Secretary responsible for intelligence will maintain overall cognizance over these activities and review their development and resource allocation. However, R&D for these activities will remain under the cognizance of the DDR&E, who will work in close coordination with the ASD(I) to develop and maintain a balanced effort in this area.

There are seven functional categories and specific activities which are now labeled "intelligence-related" and others are being considered for inclusion as well. The seven categories are:

(1) *Tactical Warning* – Those operational assets, such as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars and the Early Warning satellites, intended to provide

tactical warning (30 minutes or less) of strategic nuclear attack on the U.S. by bombers and land-based or submarine-launched missiles.

(2) *Airborne Reconnaissance* – Those military aircraft employed to search, detect, locate, categorize and/or target hostile or potentially hostile elements. Included here are the Air Force RF-4C and SR-71, Navy EP-3 and RA-5C, and the Army OV-ID.

(3) *Ocean Surveillance* – Those activities responsive to operational commanders and designed to collect and report information on military movements on, over, and under the ocean. A major example is the Navy's Sound Surveillance Under Sea System (SOSUS).

(4) *Data Relay Satellite* – A system currently under development which relays stragetic command and control communications and other important and perishable data.

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(5) *Headquarters/Other* – Intelligence and "intelligence-related" facilities and staff personnel serving, and organizationally contained in, the Unified and Specified Commands and Service Component Commands. Their function is to provide intelligence support specifically to fulfill the requirements of the Commands to which they are assigned.

(6) *SIGINT Direct Support* – SIGINT units subordinate to tactical combat commanders. These units are designed to support combat forces in wartime, and are organized and equipped according to the size, composition, missions, and operational doctrine of the forces they support.

(7) *Intelligence Training* – Operation of those facilities with a primary mission of intelligence training and education in support of defense intelligence requirements. These facilities qualify military and civilian personnel for occupational specialties in intelligence and enhance the intelligence career fields.

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The activities in each of these categories satisfy specific requirements which tie them more explicitly to combat force readiness and weapons systems than to a consolidated intelligence function. Their proximity and responsiveness to the force structure they support, particularly in wartime, are more of a consideration in determining their location in our program structure than is their relationship to peacetime intelligence activities.

7. INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Surprise Attack

Recent developments have added new dimensions to the problem of providing timely warning of surprise attack. The previous focus had been primarily on warning of surprise nuclear attack. We had reason to believe that any major attacks on NATO would be by reinforced Warsaw Pact forces and that both the preparations for reinforcement and the actual reinforcement would provide indications sufficiently early to prevent tactical surprise. However, analysis of Warsaw Pact exercises and other intelligence information acquired since the late 1960's indicates a changing threat to NATO forces, particularly in the European Central Region.

A number of trends over the past several years has emphasized a need to consider seriously the threat of a minimum-warning attack against NATO. Central to this threat is a growing Soviet emphasis in doctrine, procurement, and training exercises on the development of a capability to attack without a prior major reinforcement. Given that our current systems are focused on indications of reinforcement and increased readiness, this could result in a significant decrease in the warning of an impending attack.

In addition, the NATO concept of flexible response and control of escalation requires even more detailed and timely intelligence support to decision-makers than would a policy of massive retaliation. If our growing capability to collect information can be focused and the results processed and correlated in time, it can give the military or political decision-maker more opportunities to defuse and control a developing crisis.

A significant part of our effort to respond to this changing threat to NATO and the increased information flow is the upgrading of the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). Improvements include collocation with the National Military Command Center, installation of improved communications and automatic data processing equipment, and acquisition of necessary software to utilize better the capabilities of near real-time intelligence collection systems. These improvements should increase the probability of acquiring and recognizing the indications of potential military actions as well as providing more effective support for crisis management.

Support to Operational Commanders

Operational commanders require direct intelligence support to carry out their mission effectively. In the past, both tactical and national intelligence systems have been deficient in making optimum use of the resources in each other's systems. We are therefore instituting specific provisions which will afford operational commanders a greater utilization of our national intelligence systems in emergency and combat situations and ensure maximum support to national-level decision-makers from tactical "intelligence-related" systems. One ongoing project to use tactical resources to aid national decision-makers is the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS). Currently, this system specifically supports fleet commanders-in-chief and numbered fleet commanders with processed, all-source ocean surveillance information on a worldwide basis.

Intelligence Support

Military intelligence in support of defense and national planning traditionally focused on analyzing the balance of military power between ourselves, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. Emphasis on these balances will continue. We are, however, seeking to broaden our capabilities.

We continue to face increasing military threats from abroad. But in forming an accurate estimate of our rivals, we must also take into consideration the differing problems of morale, leadership, internal politics, and financial structure that they confront. Initiatives to improve our analysis of other countries are also underway and new methods of measuring the impact on behavior of such factors as foreign training and technology transfers are being sought.

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5. WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS) PROGRAMS

WWMCCS consists of those systems which assure communication between the NCA, the JCS, and the Unified and Specified Commanders, and support the NCA in execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and other time-sensitive operations. These systems allow the NCA to go directly to the forces as well as to the Unified and Specified Commanders. Other systems which interface with and support WWMCCS, but which exist primarily for other purposes, such as the Defense Communications System and tactical systems, are addressed more explicitly in the two following sections.

a. WWMCCS Architecture and Engineering

In general, C^3 resources have been introduced sporadically in the past as a quick response to an increased threat or to take advantage of suddenly available technology. While existing assets have the flexibility to be used effectively, they still need to be integrated more fully into an overall plan.

In recognition of this situation, a decision was made to develop an architecture, in effect a master plan, for the WWMCCS. The initial architecture is nearing completion, but a modest continuing design effort is needed to ensure that the architecture remains related to changing threats, policy and technology.

In addition, funds are being requested to continue staffing an engineering office which will, on a continuing basis, translate the approved architecture choices into efficient system designs. This year's request is for initial minimum manning of the engineering office; a gradual increase is expected over the next five years as the level of effort is determined more precisely. The amounts requested for the next year are $4.5 million for the continuing architectural effort, a decrease of $.9 million from last year, and $6.5 million for the WWMCCS Engineering Organization, an increase of $7.4 million over last year.

b. National Military Command System (NMCS)

The core and priority component of WWMCCS is the NMCS, which consists of the national level command centers and the communications which link them to intelligence systems and other subordinate command centers. At the command centers, information from various sources is processed and put in a form to facilitate decision-making by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Key inputs are warning information on potential or actual adversary action, friendly and enemy force status, and relevant information pertaining to crisis or contingency situations. The key decision-makers, the President, the Secretary of Defense, or other properly designated authority, need not be physically located at any of the command centers as long as sufficiently capable communications exist between those centers and the decision-maker to transmit and present the information in an appropriate format.

Included within the NMCS are the communications to the command posts of the Unified and Specified Commanders and their alternate, more survivable counterparts such as hardened bunkers and airborne command posts. Those commands having responsibility for the command and control of offensive nuclear forces (CINCLANT, CINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCSAC) utilize airborne command posts in addition to their ground alternate command centers. These airborne command posts, with the NEACP, and communications relay aircraft, form the World Wide Airborne Command Post system.

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In order to maintain flexibility and control of escalation, it is important that the National Command Authorities have confidence in the continuity of force control whatever the level of conflict. The three NMCS command centers must provide for this continuity all the way from normal day-to-day operations to massive strategic nuclear exchange. To ensure that the NMCS can provide this support, the three command centers have varying but interrelated capacities and degrees of survivability. Improvements in all three command centers are being made to increase these capabilities.

NMCC

The National Military Command Center, located in the Pentagon, is the hub of day-to-day and crisis management capability. A program has been underway since 1973 to improve the NMCC and provide for an effective interface with the intelligence community through the new National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). Construction changes are largely complete and an operating capability is expected by March 1976. For further enhancement of the NMCS and to provide for integration of crisis management capabilities, we are requesting FY 1977 funding of $2.0 million for the NMCS Information and Display System. The system will include an automated provision for the distribution of incoming messages, a direct connection with the NMIC for exchange of operational and intelligence data, an automated access to the WWMCCS computer data base, and a television display of critical information to key decision-makers throughout the expanded NMCC.

ANMCC

The Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) is interconnected fully with the NMCC and provides a remote facility which can be augmented rapidly with personnel to assume control of operations. Critical data bases of the NMCC are also located in the ANMCC and communications from the NMCC to the worldwide forces are routed physically through the ANMCC to permit instantaneous assumption of control at the ANMCC if needed.

Since 1974 a program has been underway to include the ANMCC message processing facility as a fully integrated portion of the program to consolidate and automate message facilities at the Pentagon. The facility will also provide a backup message processing capability to the central computer complex at the Pentagon for AUTODIN and other message traffic. The FY 1977 funding request is for $3.1 million to complete prior-year initiation of the ANMCC portion of this consolidation/automation program.

NEACP

The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) is unique in that it is an important feature of both the NMCS and the MEECN. Presently, it is based and supported at Andrews AFB, Maryland. The WWMCCS Council recently made a decision to combine the management of both the SAC Airborne Command Post and NEACP at a single operating base at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Under this concept, the NEACP aircraft would be dispersed to airfields sufficiently close to the Washington area, such as Andrews AFB, to support the National Command Authorities in crises. This new dispersal plan will not degrade the survivability of the NCA and it will increase the efficiency of operations and maintenance support of the NEACP aircraft.

A substantial increase in flexibility and capability will be provided when the three E-4 Advanced Airborne Command Posts (AABNCP), presently supporting the NEACP mission, are retrofitted to include advanced command and control and communications capability.

c. AABNCP (E-4)

In order to maintain continuity of command and control over the nuclear capable forces at high levels of nuclear exchange, a substantial improvement in the capability of the Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) for both the NEACP and SAC alternate command post is needed.

The development of an Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP) has been undertaken to remedy the limitations of space, endurance and communications capability as well as vulnerability to nuclear effects associated with the EC-135 aircraft. The principal improvements embodied in the AABNCP program are substantially increased communications capability, enhanced hardness against electromagnetic pulse, increased endurance, and a larger battle staff area. An advanced airborne satellite communications terminal, operating through the satellites of the Defense Communications System, will allow antijam secure voice and data communications to major commands. Such terminals will exist near key sites around the world. Another improvement is a higher power Very Low Frequency (VLF) transmitter. The LF/VLF transmitter will provide substantially enhanced connectivity to the nuclear capable forces with greater resistance to jamming and nuclear-induced propagation effects. Only the larger E-4 (Boeing 747 type) aircraft can accommodate these enhanced communications capabilities.

The initial phase of the AABNCP program was the equipping of the first three E-4 aircraft with the C^3 equipment from existing EC-135 aircraft. This phase has been completed within planned budget allocation and three aircraft are operationally supporting the NEACP mission.

The present phase involves the development and extensive testing of the advanced C^3 capability to validate the design and confirm operational procedures. A decision will then be made on the procurement of additional C^3 packages and aircraft. This includes the retrofit of the first three aircraft with the advanced C^3 equipment.

This current advanced C^3 development phase has experienced cost growth and has been the subject of extensive review. The WWMCCS Council, during this review, decided on the common basing and single management of the SAC and NEACP airborne command posts because of the attendant efficiencies. It was also decided that the two missions could be supported from one base by only six AABNCP's rather than seven as originally planned. The AABNCP program thus has been restructured to a six aircraft program.

The $95 million requested for FY 1977 for AABNCP would provide $75 million to continue the development and integration of the advanced C^3 capability into a test-bed aircraft, $20 million to support construction of hangar facilities for the E-4s at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, with an attendant reduction of proposed similar facilities at Andrews AFB. This includes $4 million to support planning efforts for the future enhancement of the AABNCP. The Block I program, which is now estimated to cost a total of $881 million, would provide a full operational capability of six AABNCP by early CY 1983.

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d. Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN)

Telecommunications system hardening, as well as the ability to operate in jamming environments, is too costly to be provided for most general purpose and dedicated systems. However, a major ingredient in the deterrence of nuclear conflict is the retention of a hard core capability to direct our nuclear capable forces during and after a massive nuclear attack. The collection of systems within the WWMCCS which can provide this capability is known as the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN).

To achieve an improvement in MEECN, major new programs for survivability, security, interoperability, antijam capabilities, quality, accuracy, and speed of transmission for communications to the forces are underway. In particular, investment in five areas is recommended: an AABNCP, an improved Very Low Frequency (VLF) system operating from aircraft (AABNCP and TACAMO), the evolution of a survivable satellite system, an Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) system, and a message processing system.

Satellite Communications

Satellites play an important role in improving the survivability of the command and control of the nuclear capable forces. The Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM) will use an initial space segment of several special communications transponders carried on "host" satellites (including the Navy FLTSATCOM satellites) placed in orbit for other missions, plus airborne and ground terminals. Increased capability will be provided in an evolutionary manner in a series of phases, the next being a new capability known as AFSATCOM II, which will have substantially increased electronic and physical survivability.

The transponder is presently operating on board a host satellite. Preproduction models of aircraft terminals have demonstrated their capability to provide two-way communications over the transponder with aircraft operating in the polar region.

To support the continued development and procurement of this system, we are requesting R&D funds of $15.0 million for FY 1977.

VLF and ELF Communications with Ballistic Missiles Submarines (SSBN)

The current MEECN subsystem for communications to our ballistic missile submarines is the Submarine Broadcast System, consisting of several Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Low Frequency (LF) transmitters at stations and on aircraft located throughout the world. This system provides a peacetime communications capability that is not as survivable as the SSBN force itself. The TACAMO airborne radio relay system, consisting of EC-130 aircraft with VLF transmitters and a trailing wire antenna, is the survivable element of the Submarine Broadcast System. For continuing improvement of the TACAMO program, we are requesting $10.4 million for FY 1977.

The disadvantages of LF and VLF communications stem from their vulnerability and the requirement for a submarine to place an antenna at or near the surface to receive a message, thus increasing its vulnerability to attack. Because of these vulnerabilities, we are interested in Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications. Signals at the lower ELF frequencies can penetrate the seawater to a depth of several hundred feet. This will provide communications to both ballistic and attack submarines operating at speed and depth.

Exhibit 4

ROOM H-405, U.S. CAPITOL
(202) 225-4121

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Exhibit 2

4 AUG 1978

Honorable Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

The Committee would like to bring to your attention the Subcommittee on Evaluation's staff report, Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability, three copies of which are enclosed.

The Committee was instructed by the full House to conduct a study of the quality of analytical capabilities and the organization of intelligence activities. This report was prepared pursuant to that direction, and as part of the Subcommittee's ongoing consideration of warning intelligence. It is intended to serve two purposes:

- to provide information and analysis necessary for future consideration of resources and evaluation of warning performance;

- to call the attention of the intelligence community to areas of relative neglect in indications and warning and to the need for more focused leadership.

The Subcommittee has found that warning is a vitally important, yet vast and elusive, mission. Effective warning draws on the performance of almost the entire intelligence community. It also requires the understanding of intelligence users, since misperceptions about the warning process can contribute to "intelligence failures." For these reasons, warning is a particularly appropriate subject for sustained Congressional oversight.

The Subcommittee on Evaluation plans to hold hearings on warning in the fall. Prior to these hearings, it will review your response to the Committee's request, made in the FY 1979 authorization bill report, for a report on actions taken to create a leadership focus for warning. Intelligence community views on that and other subjects considered in the staff report will be solicited at the time of the hearings.

ST

Should you wish to comment on the staff report prior to the hearings, the Subcommittee will consider your views with great interest.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

Edward P. Boland

EDWARD P. BOLAND
Chairman

Enclosure

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200150016-3

I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This report evaluates present warning capability by asking: how well has the "warning community" responded to lessons of the past?

The Subcommittee finds that some lessons have been learned more readily than others. Emphasis on collection and on other problems that can be addressed primarily with technology has overshadowed attention to improving analysis and to minimizing uncertainty in the production process. Five major lessons are identified:

Lesson 1: Improved Collection. Every crisis has stimulated collection efforts, advances in coverage, timeliness, accuracy and frequency. Technical developments and a continual learning process have dramatically improved collection capabilities in most areas.

Lesson 2: Better Information Management and Warning Procedures. Major changes in the organization of the "warning community," changes in communications and warning procedures, and widespread adoption of automated data processing have been spurred by past crises. Due to the absence of a focal point for community-wide warning policy in recent years, efforts to test the utility of new warning procedures, reporting formats, and crisis management procedures have been inconclusive.

Lesson 3: Better Analysis. Analytical pitfalls have been recognized in post-mortems and other studies of past

warning situations, and limited organizational and training efforts have been undertaken in response. Existing mechanisms do not ensure that analysts ask all pertinent questions or that they confront reasonable alternative hypotheses; the use of structured and analytical methodologies is still in its infancy, and improving analysis through better personnel management receives little concentrated attention.

Lesson 4: Expectations of Unambiguous Warning. Although history has demonstrated that warning is likely to be ambiguous, the expectation of collecting unambiguous indications continues to prevail. There has been little progress in developing warning products that reduce unnecessary ambiguity by informing users of the probability of an event, and of the level of the analyst's certainty in estimating it.

Lesson 5: Users' Resistance to Warning. Past cases suggest that users' resistance to warning can contribute to "intelligence failure." Since decision makers' use of warning products lies outside of intelligence activities, the issue receives little attention from the intelligence community.

Because of relatively little attention to analysis and to minimizing unnecessary ambiguity, intelligence performance in future warning situations is likely to reveal familiar

weaknesses. Enough intelligence will have been collected, and, in general, processing and dissemination will be timely. While analysis may be good, key questions may not be addressed. Differences among the views within the intelligence community may not be explicit, and the warning products will not indicate changes in the estimated likelihood of an event. As a result, the warning judgments received by decision makers will be less than clear and convincing.

The report finds that the persistence of these weaknesses is attributable to a lack of adequate leadership in the "warning community." The need for more focused leadership is evident, both at the community level and in the management of the DoD Indications System.

Therefore, it recommends:

- That the Director of Central Intelligence provide a focus for warning leadership in the community, which may require appointment of a special assistant for warning;

- that the Secretary of Defense and the Services provide for the implementation of a comprehensive upgrade of the DIA-managed World-Wide Indications and Warning System, including clearer demarcation of authority and management responsibility among DIA, the Services and the Commands; and designation of a single point of accountability within DIA for DIA's management responsibilities for the System.

These recommendations are further detailed in Section VI, "Assessment."

Union Calendar No. 942

95TH CONGRESS
2d Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT
No. 95-1795

ANNUAL REPORT

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95TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

REPORT

BY THE

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OCTOBER 14, 1978.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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(8) the development of a uniform set of definitions for terms to be used in policies or guidelines which may be adopted by the executive or legislative branches to govern, clarify, and strengthen the operation of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

(b) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence shall report the results of the study provided for by this section to the House, together with any recommendations for legislative or other actions as it deems appropriate, not later than the close of the Ninety-fifth Congress.

The following is submitted in response to the above direction.

QUALITY

The Subcommittee on Evaluation, chaired by Representative Charles Rose (Democrat, N.C.), has taken the lead for the full Committee in assessing the quality of the analytic capabilities of our intelligence and intelligence-related activities and in examining means for integrating more closely analytic intelligence and policy formulation. This is an enormous and complex subject and obviously the Committee in its little more than one year in existence has only scratched the surface in reviewing all the analytic capabilities of the government's intelligence activities.

Thus far, the Committee has focused on organizational and management issues as they impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence to provide support to its users. It has also examined a number of substantive intelligence products such as the National Intelligence Estimates and reviewed reporting on such trouble spots as Somalia/Ethiopia and most recently Nicaragua. While it finds the reporting generally responsive to user requirements, it has also found that there may be considerable room for improvement—especially in such areas as estimating, forecasting and trend analysis reporting. It plans a detailed study of this problem during the coming year.

Having examined the relationship among collection, processing and analysis in selected areas, the Committee notes that the attention of the intelligence community appears to be directed primarily to increasing collection, while other fundamental problems go relatively unattended. These include analytical problems which cannot be attributed to lack of data.

The Subcommittee on Evaluation has, however, examined several topic areas in depth, areas chosen because their scope and impact affect a wide range of intelligence and policy matters.

One such area is called "Warning", i.e., the range of intelligence collection, processing, analysis and reporting of data which is intended to provide our policy makers sufficient lead time before an event occurs to develop our own course of action to either deter, alter or respond to the impending development. The Subcommittee on Evaluation's study of the performance of warning intelligence has examined the warning process in some detail, focusing on lessons learned from past crises such as Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, the Cuba Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1973 Mid-East War. One major conclusion of this study is that great improvements have been made in the collection, processing and dissemination of data useful

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in the warning process but that improvements in analysis and the integration of analysis with policy formulation have lagged far behind.

By sharing the findings of the Subcommittee with the Executive Branch, and entering into a dialogue on these issues, the Committee has already seen a positive step taken to provide a leadership focus for warning in the intelligence community. This was a direct result of the Committee calling this inadequacy to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence.

During its inquiries into the quality of intelligence, the Committee has found one continuing and persistently troubling issue wherever it has looked—namely, what is the requirement for any particular intelligence activity? To make a judgment as to whether or not a specific component of the intelligence community is performing its function adequately, it is imperative to know what requirements the user has levied on that component. The Committee has found to be ineffective the efforts of the Executive Branch to identify gaps in, and take steps to satisfy requirements for, collection or analysis.

The Department of Defense has created a new position, that of the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, who is charged with the validation of intelligence requirements. The Intelligence Community Staff is also studying this problem on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence. Likewise, the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council is charged by Executive Order 12036 with establishing "requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence." The Committee will be looking closely during the coming year at those Executive Branch efforts which attempt to determine requirements and upon which an evaluation of the effectiveness of our intelligence activities can be built.

The Committee also notes that the subject of requirements is an enormously complex one and one which the steps taken to date by the Executive Branch may not resolve. The Committee points, for example, to the fact that the National Security Council's Policy Review Committee is restricted to establishing requirements and priorities for "national" intelligence. Responsibility for assigning priorities among requirements for both tactical military and "national" intelligence apparently has not been assigned to any official or group of officials within the Executive Branch nor is there any provision for the rapid and smooth transition from a peacetime environment to a wartime footing where intelligence requirements and management is concerned. The Committee intends to look deeper into these issues in the coming year.

LEGISLATIVE CHARTERS

A key aspect of the present structure and functioning of the nation's foreign intelligence activities is the fact that only the Central Intelligence Agency of all the elements engaged in foreign intelligence has been created by legislation. The National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency have been operating for years without legislative charters. Further, the CIA charter consists only of a few paragraphs in the National Security Act of 1947 and a subsequent CIA Act of 1949 which largely addressed itself to administrative details. For the most part, authority for the conduct of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection, dissemination, and analysis